

472

ATTACHMENT B

PROJECT OFTEN

Box #1

File #1: OFTEN -- Correspondence, 11/65-3/68

File #2: Contract #4505, 1966-1970

File #3: Contract #4504, 1971

Reports:

- 1. & 2. 3/4/68, Final Report, ORD 1516-66, Studies of Screening of Chemical Compounds for Detection of Behavioral Effects, Contract #4505-66 (Two Copies)
- 3. & 4. 6/24/68, Interim Report, ORD 4225-68, Contract 4505 (Two Copies)
- 5. 10/24/68, Report Regarding Contract #4505, ORD 7263-68, "...set down for the record the procedure that has evolved this year on the project..."
- 6. & 7. 11/2/68, Interim Report, ORD 7263-68, Contract #4505 (Two Copies)
- 8. 2/26/69, Proposal, ORD 1629-69, Extension of Contract #4505
- 9. 2/17/69, Technical Proposal, ORD 1355-69, Follow-on to Contract #4505
- 10. & 11. 7/2/69, Final Report, ORD 4596-69, "Studies of Screening of Chemical Compounds for Detection of Behavioral Effects," Contract #4504-66
- 12. 3/12/70, Proposal, ORD 1566-70, Follow-on to Contract #4505

File #4: Contract #5843, 4/1/71-2/4/72

File #5: Contract #9384, 1972-1973

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58-215

172

PROJECT OFTEN

Box #1 (Cont'd.)

File #6: OFTEN -- [redacted], Neurotransmitters and Tissue Culture Screens

File #7: [redacted] Contract #71-530, 1972-1973

File #8: [redacted] Personal Services, 1969-1970

Box #2

CHICKMIT

File #1: Edgewood Arsenal [redacted] Contract #70-606, 1969-1972

File #2: Edgewood Arsenal [redacted] Contract #73-606, 1973

Reports:

1. 6/25/64, ORD 5115-66, Quarterly Report #1, "European and Far Eastern Biological Information," [redacted]
2. 7/27/66, ORD 5155-66, Quarterly Report #4, "European and Far Eastern Biological Information," [redacted]
3. 11/1/68, ORD 8306-68, Quarterly Report #2, "European and Far Eastern Biological Information," [redacted]
4. 9/1/68, ORD 6149-68, Quarterly Report #1, "European and Far Eastern Biological Information," [redacted]

OFTEN REPORTS

1. [redacted] -- ORD 7001-69. "Addendum Grooming Activity of Albion Mice Effect of Chlordiazepoxide and AHR-1900"
2. [redacted] -- Appendix Second Quarterly Report (no date)

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58-216

472

Box #2 (Cont'd.)

- 3. [redacted] -- ORD 1145-70, "Third Quarterly Report on Contract 4505-03"
- 4. [redacted] -- ORD 3981-70, "Fourth Quarterly Report, Vol. I on Contract 4505-03"

Box #3

OFTEN REPORTS

- 1. [redacted] ORD 3981-70, "Fourth Quarterly Report, Vol. II on Contract 4505-03"
- 2. [redacted] -- ORD 7134-70, 10/6/70, "Quarterly Report on Contract 4505-03"
- 3. [redacted] -- ORD 8526-70, "6th Quarterly Report on Contract 4505-03"
- 4. [redacted] -- 9/14/71, "First Quarterly Report on Contract 5843"
- 5. [redacted] -- 10/28/71, "Second Quarterly Report on Contract 5943"

Box #4

OFTEN REPORTS

- 1. [redacted] -- ORD 2791-71, "Quarterly Report Covering 11/1/70 to 4/30/71 on Contract 4505-03"
- 2. [redacted] -- ORD 1838-72, "Third Quarterly Report on Contract 5843"
- 3. [redacted] -- ORD 3568-72, "First Quarterly Report on Contract 9384 covering 2/16/72 to 5/16/72"

Box #5

Computer tabulation of clinical test data on response of humans to drugs being studied

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58-217

472

PROJECT UTTER

Box #5 (Cont'd.)

Computer tabulation of clinical test data on response of mice to drugs being studied

Tape and computer tabulation of the Merck Index

Box #6

- Tape #292
- Tape #339
- Tape #293
- Tape #308
- Tape #220

Original test data from Edgewood Arsenal on mice treated with drugs - 80-character card images (approx. 60 cases of cards)

Box #7

- Tape #384
- Tape #385
- Tape #386
- Tape #387
- Tape #388

Duplicate of tapes contained in Box #6

Box #8

- Tape #305 and its duplicate -
- Tape #190
- Tape #353 and its duplicate -
- Tape #204
- Tape #043 and its duplicate -
- Tape #260

Original raw data from [redacted] sequential card or print images

Box #9

- Tape #196 and its duplicate -
- Tape #252
- Tape #283 and its duplicate -
- Tape #366

SYMOUTS of [redacted] and Edgewood final data bases. (SYMOUT is System Development Corporation's ADEPT system designation for an output of the data as it was input. Each field of data is preceded by a number and right parenthesis to identify the field category. Probably usable data.)

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58-216

472

Box #10

Tape #307 and its duplicate - } GULF of Edgewood and [redacted] final data
Tape #396 } bases, as well as DEFINE, COMPOSE, and
Tape #295 and its duplicate - } SHOW routines. (GULF is System Develop-
Tape #186 } ment Corporation's designation for an
Tape #168 and its duplicate - } output of a file as it physically exists
Tape #057 } on disk. Hence, a data file would in-
Tape #103 and its duplicate - } clude the inverted files, as well as the
Tape #192 } data. Would be difficult to use without
the ADEPT system.)

Box #11

Tape #340 and its duplicate - } Original Wiswesser Line Notation (WLN)
Tape #343 } from Edgewood
Tape #372 } Original human clinical data from Edgewood
Tape #144 }
Tape #159 }
Tape #098 }

One (1) listing with blue cover - sample printout of Edgewood data.

One (1) listing with black cover - printout of human clinical data from Edgewood.

One (1) set of blank forms to correspond with human clinical data.

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58-219


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

28 October 2010


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD (MFR)

SUBJECT: (U) Classified Drug Testing Data Loaned to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Being Returned to Department of Defense (DoD)

1. (U//FOUO) This MFR is to officially document the CIA's shipment and return of classified data to DoD's custody. This data was originally sent on temporary loan to the CIA's Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T) during the early 1970s for research and reference purposes. Included with this MFR is an attached listing, describing the box content of unmarked and classified data being returned to DoD.
2. (U//FOUO) I have consulted with the necessary CIA/DS&T personnel to confirm that this data is no longer needed by the CIA. However, it is my understanding that DoD believes this information could be useful to them in investigating medical claims that they may receive. Therefore, these records are being returned to the custody of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and shipped directly to Mr. Glen Winzenburg, Security Manager, Force Health Protection & Readiness Policy & Programs (TMA).
3. (U) I am requesting that both parties sign this MFR, indicating acceptance for CIA's return and DoD's acknowledgement and receipt of this classified data.
4. (U) If you have any questions regarding this records transaction, please contact Ron _____, (703) 613-1676 or Bob _____, (703) 613-0059.


Ron _____, CIA

1 Nov 2010
Date


Robert _____, CIA

28 Oct '10
Date


Glen K. Winzenburg, DoD

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

SUBJECT: (U) Classified Drug Testing Data Loaned to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Being Returned to Department of Defense (DoD)

(U//FOUO) The table below provides an inventory of the classified data shipped from the CIA and returned to the custody of DoD.

ITEM	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DATE	CLASSIFICATION
TAPE 1	340 WLN Raw data 80/2000 (see tape 343)	2 May 1972	Secret
TAPE 2	343 WLN Raw data (backup) 80/2000 (See tape 340)	2 May 1972	Secret
TAPE 3	421 J372 Human Clinical Data	2 Oct 1973	Secret
TAPE 4	422 J144 Human Clinical Data	Undated	Secret
TAPE 5	423 J159 Human Clinical Data	Undated	Secret
TAPE 6	424 J098 Human Clinical Data	Undated	Secret
1 FOLDER (w/12 items)	MFR - Subject: Directions for Preparation and Shipment of Blood Samples - 2 pages	22 Oct 1971	Unmarked
	Check List of Symptoms - Blank forms - 3 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	Manifest Description: Box#5 - Computer tabulation of clinical test data on response of humans to drugs being studied. - 1 page	Undated	Unmarked
	Handwritten Notes - Joe Clinical data from Edwan - 2 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	Serial Measures SMUEA-R Form 25 (15 Jun 68) - 1 copy	Undated	Unmarked
	SMUEA-BL Form 21 (1 Oct 71) 2 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	SMUEA-BL Form 16 (1 Oct 71) 3 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	Behavior Check List - 3 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	SMUEA-R Form 23, Medical Volunteer Information - Pages 1 of 16, 2 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	SMUEA-BL Form 43, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) (1 Oct 71) 3 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	SMUEA-BL Form 30, Behavior Check List (1 Oct 71) 3 copies	Undated	Unmarked
	SMUEA-R Form 80, Army Classification Battery (ACB) Scores from DA-20 (1 Oct 68) 3 copies	Undated	Unmarked
1 - Computer Printout - (3 1/2")	Box#5 Tape Printout - Computer generated Medical Listing	24 Mar 72	Unmarked

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

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ORD-3361-75

8 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/S&T Task Force for Senate Select Committee

SUBJECT: Computer Tape Review

REFERENCE: 1. Senate Select Committee Request 1684,
1 August 1975 (OFTEN).

2. ORD-3318-75, Memorandum for DD/S&T Task
Force for Senate Select Committee dated
5 August 1975

1. As stated in referent 2, we recalled the six boxes of computer tapes from storage. Our records showed that among the six boxes there were many duplicates and, furthermore, that the tapes in only one box contained solely CIA data. The remaining five boxes all were shown to contain third agency material either exclusively or merged with data compiled by an Agency contractor. To confirm the general content of the tapes and our record of contents, we had computer printouts made.

2. A complete printout, in duplicate, was made of all the tapes in one box that contained no third agency material. The material consists of original raw data from an ORD contractor with whom we had a classified association contract. The raw data, compiled under Project OFTEN, concerns testing on cats, rats, mice, and monkeys. As you requested, we are forwarding only one copy of the entire printout for review by the Committee Staff. We can get additional copies if desired.

3. We only had partial printouts made of tapes in the five remaining boxes which our records show contained third agency material. This was done to see if the tapes contained the type information indicated by our records. It appears they do, and it also appears that our records are accurate in showing that there are duplicate copies of all but four of the 34 tapes. Since each of the tapes in these five boxes contains data originated by a third agency, and since release has not been coordinated with the third agency, the partial printouts are not included in this response.

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SUBJECT: Computer Tape Review

4. The five boxes with third agency data are as follows: One box, together with a box of duplicates, contains test material from a third agency. Two boxes have tapes, and accompanying duplicates, that contain what appears to be machine (computer) oriented data relating to the merging--without attribution to originator--of animal test data compiled by an Agency contractor and data from a third agency. The remaining box has six tapes--only one a duplicate--that contain test data from a third agency.

5. This input did not require coordination by other Offices within the DD/S&T, nor was there a need to check names for cover status.

6. Retrieval, printout, and review of this material required 11 hours professional time, 1 hour of clerical time, 20 hours of technical (computer operator) time, and 7.5 hours of computer time.

/s/ JAMES V. HIRSCH

James V. Hirsch
Director of Research and Development

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - D/ORD

1 - C/MS/ORD

1 - ORD Chrono

MS/ORD/DD/S&T:HEGordon: 8 August 1975

*ORD time 17 hrs
20:00 computer op
7.5 computer time*

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DDS&T/3806/77

8 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : LESLIE C. DIRKS
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : OFTEN and CHICKWIT

1. (U) This memorandum reports on eleven boxes of material pertaining to Projects CHICKWIT and OFTEN, referred to in your Senate testimony of 3 August 1977.

2. (U) The eleven boxes, retrieved from our Records Center on 4 August 1977, contain 38 files and reports, three computer printouts, and 35 computer tapes. The manifest (Attachment 1) which accompanied the boxes, lists the contents of each box. We have verified the contents (with a minor exception noted in Attachment 1). To supplement this manifest, we have prepared an item-by-item description (Attachment 2) of each document/file/tape. A special problem with the verification of the contents of the computer tapes is addressed in Appendix I.

3. ~~(C)~~ Pending your approval, we plan to provide Edgewood Arsenal with these descriptions, calling their attention to those documents which refer directly or indirectly to work that might have been done at Edgewood. The purpose of this release would be to provide Edgewood Arsenal with leads to documents they might have in their possession. Again, pending your approval, we would make available copies of the original documents to Edgewood.

4. (U) The majority of material deal with animal testing. However, for your information, box 5 contains data on the effects of various (unidentified) compounds on human volunteers. These data apparently were supplied to the Office of Research and Development by Edgewood Arsenal. We have found nothing in the eleven boxes of material or in our files to suggest that these data were collected for CIA, nothing to

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~~This document is downgraded to
CONFIDENTIAL upon removal of
attachments~~

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DDS&T/3806/77

Page 2

SUBJECT: OFTEN and CHICKWIT

indicate that CIA funded the studies, and nothing to indicate "...CIA was calling the shots." The data in box 5 appear to have been collected during the period 1960 through 1966 and thus antedated Projects OFTEN/CHICKWIT.

5. (C) It is important to call to your attention that as a result of a review of ORD programs, during a December 1972 Quarterly Review, the DDS&T directed that the program be terminated. The program was terminated in January 1973 with final accounting in April 1973. All files pertaining to this program were sent to the Agency Archives with instructions that they be made accessible only to the DCI, DDS&T, or Director of ORD. Subsequent to the termination of this program the material was recalled and furnished to the Rockefeller Commission, the Senate Select Committee and the Kennedy Committee.

6. (U) Several reconstructions of Projects OFTEN/CHICKWIT history have been prepared in recent years. The focus of these reconstructions has been to confirm or deny whether CIA funded drug research on humans. The various reconstructions are not wholly in agreement on this point, as discussed below. However, there is agreement that the intent of Project OFTEN, as originally conceived, was to progress to the testing of drugs on humans.

7. (C) The chronology of research efforts in this area of which we are aware appears to be as follows:

1960 - 1966 Various compounds were tested on humans by Edgewood Arsenal. Sponsorship unknown. Results aroused CIA interest for both defensive and offensive applications.

1967 - 1969 [redacted] (funded via Edgewood Arsenal) performed literature search on foreign pharmacological developments. Sponsored by CIA (Project CHICKWIT).

1966 - 1973 Research on mice, cats, rats and monkeys conducted at [redacted] Sponsored by CIA (Project OFTEN).

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Page 3


1972 - 1973 Program reviewed at December Quarterly. DDS&T instructed D/ORD to terminate program and forward all documents to Agency Archives. Program terminated January 1973 with final accounting in April 1973.

1971 - 1973 Research on detection and means of delivery to rabbits of a specific compound carried out by Edgewood Arsenal. Sponsored by CIA (Project OFTEN).

Tests of at least one compound on humans by Edgewood Arsenal. Sponsorship in doubt. (See the following paragraph)

8. ~~(C)~~ Five memoranda, relating to the history of these projects, are attached (Attachments 3 through 7). Although there is some ambiguity with regard to human testing in three of them (Attachments 4, 5, and 6), the most recent (Attachment 7) documents a discussion with the principal Edgewood Arsenal investigator who unequivocally stated that the intended Agency-sponsored testing of human subjects during 1971-1973 under Project OFTEN never occurred due to termination of the project.

9. (U) You should also be aware that we are in the process of responding to an FOIA request on these materials. A releasable, sanitized package of material, summarizing the contents of these eleven boxes, has been prepared. Its release is awaiting coordination from Department of Army which has been in receipt of the material since April 1977.



LESLIE C. DIRKS

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ATTACHMENT B

INFLUENCING HUMAN BEHAVIORACTIVITY - Drug Research

PROGRAM - To develop ways for predictably influencing human behavior through the use of drugs.


The drug research program began in FY-1966 with a proposed Behavioral Pharmacology program. The program objective was to develop an Agency capability to manipulate human behavior in a predictable manner through the use of drugs. Examples of operational situations where use of drugs might help were interrogation situations, penetration of guarded areas, covert action, and paramilitary operations.

A phased program was envisioned that would consist of the acquisition of drugs and chemical compounds having desired behavioral effects, testing and evaluating these materials through primary and secondary procedures and toxicological studies. Promising compounds from tests with animals were to be clinically evaluated with human subjects. It was proposed that when testing with human subjects was required the tests would be done jointly with the Chemical Research and Development Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories (EARL), and the U.S. Army. Substances of potential use, uncovered in testing, were to be further structurally analyzed so that new derivatives with greater utility could be synthesized.

Samples of drugs and chemicals for testing in the program were obtained from drug and pharmaceutical companies, government agencies (EARL, NIH, FDA, and VA), research laboratories, and other researchers; most came from the drug industries where the substance had been rejected because of undesired side effects.

The program was made up of Projects OFTEN and CHICKWIT. Project OFTEN dealt with the testing of behavioral and toxicological effects of drugs in animals and ultimately in humans; Project CHICKWIT, with the acquisition of information and samples of new drug developments in Europe and the Far East.

A special review panel with members from ORD and TSD was organized to oversee the research program and to assist in the selection of compounds for testing. Panel meetings were held periodically for progress reports and program guidance. On several occasions upper management including the DCI, the Executive Director/Comptroller, DDP, and the DD/S&T were briefed on the drug research program.

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The principal contractor under Project OFTEN was [redacted] which received its first contract in FY-1956 (Table 1) and continued under contract until January 1973 when the contract was terminated by direction from the DCI. [redacted] established and used test procedures with animals from which the behavioral effects of drugs and chemical compounds in humans could be predicted. As the program progressed, additional secondary screening procedures were introduced using nonhuman primates as necessary prerequisites to testing with humans. [redacted] employed Dr. [redacted] [redacted] Dr. [redacted] University of Pennsylvania; as consultants and Dr. [redacted] [redacted] as a subcontractor, who provided information on new drugs and chemicals and assisted in the screening and testing of selected new drugs and chemicals.

Synthesis of new drugs or derivatives for Project OFTEN was done by [redacted] (Table 2). Their first work began in mid FY-1971 and was also terminated with the directive from the DCI in January 1973.

[redacted] George Washington University, performed several literature surveys for the program under a personal services contract (Table 3).

Association with Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories started in FY-1967 with a transfer of Project CHICKWIT funds to EARL to jointly support the [redacted] collection of information on and samples of new drugs in Europe and the Far East (Table 4). Out of this association with EARL came information and samples of new drugs obtained by [redacted] and EARL results on the clinical testing and screening of new drugs and chemical compounds using animals and humans as test subjects. These data were merged with test data and information from other sources into a computer controlled data base.

Analysis of the Edgewood file data identified EA#3167 as a potential incapacitant. Edgewood Arsenal had partially investigated EA#3167 with animals and found it to be effective percutaneously, in tests with humans the drug had been only administered intermuscularly. Our interest in further testing of EA#3167 arose from its potential threat to U.S. VIP's and other key personnel if, indeed, it could be easily administered by oral or trans-dermal routes. Our joint effort with EARL to test the compound began with the \$37,000 transfer in FY-1971 to support additional pharmacological studies and clinical testing with human volunteer subjects (five prisoners from Holmesburg State Prison, Holmesburg, Pa., and fifteen military volunteers) in the Edgewood program. The protocol used by Edgewood in enlisting volunteers for the EA#3167 testing and the safeguards practiced during testing were analogous to those stated in the

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unclassified Report Number VII, ID50 of Agent 925 by Dr. Herbert W. Copelan, Ivy Research Laboratories, Inc., submitted in May, 1970, to the Medical Research Laboratories, Directorate of Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, namely:

"The human subject in this test conducted by this organization are volunteers. There is no coercion or inducement to volunteer except for incentive pay utilized as a part of the test procedure and payment for discomfort of blood testing and screening procedures. Stringent medical safeguards surround every human test."

Although a final report on this effort is not available, we were informed that EA#3167 can be effectively administered by both oral and trans-dermal routes with after effects lasting up to six weeks.

Agency support to the clinical testing of EA#3167 and collection of information on and samples of foreign drug developments was terminated in January 1973. Because of the prolonged after effects of EA#3167, additional charges to the contract were made after this date for necessary post-test follow-up observations and examinations of the volunteer.

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2 August 1977

NOTE TO:

SUBJECT: Project OFTEN (U)

(U) To the best of my recollection, Project OFTEN was in existence from about 1964 to 1972 under the direction of the Office of Research and Development. The program involved the identification and preliminary testing of drugs or chemicals which might fit the requirements established by the Technical Services Division. In the first stage, ORD identified substances of potential value from drug houses, Food and Drug Administration as well as other pharmaceutical sources. The chemical formula and properties were incorporated in a computer tape for initial screening. In the second stage, a few substances were selected (I would guess 20) for preliminary testing by . This testing involved toxicological studies and animal screening. It did not involve human testing. The third stage was the selection from the screening of suitable substances for human testing through Edgewood Arsenal. Edgewood Arsenal was selected because it was, at that time, the primary federal laboratory authorized to undertake human experimentation through the use of volunteers (with their knowledge and consent and only after completion of the Phase II studies). I do not believe that any drug or substance was actually entered into Phase III and used in human experimentation.

3 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Background Information on Possible Questionable
Activity - [REDACTED] - 2 May 1974

1. [REDACTED] is now with OJCS, but is resigning to take a job with the Geological Survey. He was with ORD prior to the surplus exercise last spring, being one of those who was cut at the time, being fortunate enough to get a job with OJCS because of his experience with machine management of data, etc. He said that he had a bad taste left in his mouth because of the experience last spring, and is going with the Geological Survey where Civil Service procedures would protect him from the sort of things that happened in the Agency with its reduction in force last year.
2. [REDACTED] had a problem on his mind that he wanted to be sure about. When with ORD he was working on an ORD Project OFTEN. He wanted to know if the Director knew about it, and what was being done about it. Beyond that, as our conversation developed, he wanted to know how the Agency would respond if the story of OFTEN leaked to the press sometime in the future, now that there is no one left who knows the story.
3. [REDACTED] observed that as he thought about Project OFTEN in retrospect he had serious reservations about its purpose. Initially he talked obliquely about it but finally overcame his inhibitions and described it in terms that made it clear that he felt the main thrust of the project was to find out about drugs and chemicals that could be used on foreign public figures to affect their behavior. He said that if they could be used on foreigners they could also be used on Americans. It was implicit in the way he expressed his opinions that he had basic reservations about the first purpose, and was toying with at least theoretical reservations about what the Agency would do in domestic affairs. I took to philosophizing with [REDACTED] I said that it would be correct to describe certain aspects of CIA activities as an anomaly in an open society, but

that our organization was the result of a unique world situation and that the basic problem was to have the Agency in a position to serve the proper requirements of the Government. He spoke about CIA's involvement in paramilitary activity overseas. I said that every President at some point along the way since WWII had involved our Government in the support of regular and/or irregular forces around the world, both in the post WWII period and during the freeing of the colonial areas, when there was considerable question as to whether the new individual countries would go from one kind of servience to another. One could take considerable exception to CIA having been thrust into this kind of activity but the fact is it had been. We had supplied arms, guidance, and support under presidential directives all around the world. Sometimes we did it well and sometimes not so well, and there were varying degrees in the correctness of the judgment. I felt that he should keep in mind the fact that the Agency is staffed by conscientious American citizens who exist very much in the tradition of our country. We are responsive to the needs and interests of our Oversight Committees in Congress as well as to the Executive Branch of the Government.

4. I asked if the experimentation with the drugs and chemicals could not serve the purpose of making us aware of various things that could be used against our own people and thereby serve as a defensive purpose. If this had occurred to him he did not say so and he really did not answer my question.

5. [redacted] then expressed concern over the attempt to "cover up" this project. I told him that I thought this was an incorrect characterization. The Agency has many sensitive activities to which a large number of people have access on the basis of a general need-to-know. Some projects are widely compartmented to protect the lives of individuals. I described how communications on such activities are handled. I said that some activities are tightly compartmented to prevent the opposition from learning of the activity and being able to negate it. I said that there was nothing at all unusual about establishing a bigot list, restricting the access of people to a particular activity, and then maintaining the level of protection after the project is terminated.

- 2 -

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6. [] told me that Mr. Helms had cancelled the project in January 1973 and he assumed therefore Mr. Helms knew the details of the project. He wanted to know what the present Director knew about it. Saying that I did not know ^{whether} the present Director knew about this, I expressed the opinion that since it had been terminated there was no real need for him to familiarize himself with all the details of it. It was clear from our records, arising from the exercise last year to determine those activities that were questionable, that the project had been terminated and that the DDS&T was to talk with the DCI about the disposal of the records. I did not know whether that exchange had occurred yet and reiterated my opinion that the present Director had no real need to acquaint himself with all the details of the project in the past. [] expressed the opinion that because he was a former DDO man that he might not have the proper attitude towards this type of project. I assured Mr. [] that the present Director had given every indication of being somewhat different from the stereotype that he attributed to the DDO. I described in the most general terms what he had done to terminate and modify a wide range of activities that had been carried on in the past but times are somewhat different, expressing the opinion that these activities would have met the sternest requirements of the most liberal critics. I view this as a reflection of the changing character of CIA as the old Cold War days receded into the past and some new kind of situation emerged.

7. I have no certainty that [] accepted my rationale ~~concerning~~ although his concern on this seemed to subside as we discussed the matter. He then moved to a new level of concern. He is leaving in a week and says that there is no one left in the Agency who really is familiar with the details of the project. He asked what sort of records there were about it. I said that I assumed that normal project papers did not describe it in the detail that he knew it, but that the files held in ORD probably did and some administrative paper ~~that~~ described what it was about. He said that if this matter leaked to the public that there may be no one in the Agency who could respond knowledgeably. He guesses that the Agency would reply that there had been some experiments in chemicals and that is all it would say. I said that so far as a public response is concerned that is probably the most the Agency would say regardless of how much it knew about the project. However, were the story to leak out the Agency would

- 3 -

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report it fully to our Oversight Committees if it has not already done so. [] said that Messrs. [] and [] have left ORD, and with him leaving in the next week there would be no one left who knows the project. He was called about two weeks ago to go back and look through the material, and assumes that a decision has been taken to file the records in some fashion, but he doubts if any one would be able to decipher them. His review covered some 30 tapes.

8. [] told me that in one instance a university professor was paid for his work on this project through a drug company. He wondered if that is ordinary. I told him that CIA did a lot of R&D contracting through prime contractors and subcontractors, rather than engaging a lot of in-house work and multiple contracts. From my own experience with a consulting firm some years ago, Agency R&D contracting was relatively effective in contrast to much of that carried on in DOD. I see nothing sinister in contracting arrangements. He seemed to accept this. [] said that much of the data that CIA got came from Edgewood Arsenal which did a lot of animal testing for us. We got drugs from drug companies and tested them for their affect on animals. Obviously there were a lot of intermediate tests and actually planned to be tested on people. One plan that he had discussed was feeding a chemical to an Arab, which would affect his virility. An Arab's manhood being important to him--we would then ^{introduce} ~~introduce~~ ^{who would be important to him} him to a psychiatrist for operational reasons while appearing to cure him. I expressed skepticism over the practicality of ~~over~~ the scenario. [] referred to a behavior chemical that came to be known as "Boomer". It could be applied through a simple handshake. Grease would be put on the thumb to protect it and then this material put on top of the grease. The mere application to some one's hand through a handshake would ^{introduce} ~~introduce~~ some dramatic results. [] said that Army volunteers were used to test the chemical compound. This was generally in the area of hallucinogens. He did not know but thought that this involved some sort of prison population.

9. There were four tapes from Edgewood that included the names along with biographic data of some of the people tested. He had assembled this material but did not know that this sort of information was in it until he went over the tapes a couple of weeks ago. I observed that file holdings on Americans had been reviewed and some eliminated, and that this might be subject to review again.

- 4 -

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I suggested to [redacted] that he write a short memorandum describing the project as he understood it with such data as he could provide. I suggested three to five pages. I also suggested that he classify it properly, probably SECRET/SENSITIVE. He asked where he could have it typed and I said we would type it in this office in one copy. I undertook to check the status of the files and if necessary report to the DCI.

10. [redacted] said that he hoped his action would not be considered taking a shot at ORD for surpassing him last year. I said that it was not and thought his action thoughtful and constructive. He left saying that he would return with the memorandum in a couple of days.

[redacted]
S. D. Breckinridge

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

VVA023832
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ORD-4866-73

1 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of ORD

SUBJECT: OJCS Involvement with Project OFTEN

1. OJCS was involved with Project OFTEN in two quite distinct ways. First, some software programs were converted by them to run on the OJCS computers. Second, plans were formulated for using the GIMS II data management system to support Project OFTEN.

2. The software programs, which were converted for use on the OJCS hardware, were programs which used, as input, the WISSWESSER line notation for chemical compounds and produced, as output, a graphic representation of the structure of the compound. No physicochemical data or other information about the compounds are incorporated in the software program. The work associated with this conversion was charged to a project known to OJCS as ORDSTAT which has been used over the years to provide scientific program support to ORD. These programs are retained by OJCS.

3. Several attempts were made at different times during Project OFTEN to transfer the file management functions from ADEPT to GIMS II. This transfer was never effected due to delays in the GIMS II system becoming operational. The most recent attempt was scheduled to have been undertaken in January 1973 but was stopped because Project OFTEN was terminated. OJCS personnel had been briefed on the nature of the project, the type of data involved, and the kind of processing needed.

[]

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58-192